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Article 
The Morality of Compulsory Licensing as 
an Access to Medicines Tool 
Margo A. Bagley† 
  INTRODUCTION   
Patents and drug products seem to go hand in hand.1 The 
right to exclude granted by a patent is widely considered 
essential to pharmaceutical investment and development.2 
Moreover, the deadweight losses that patents create are 
generally considered justifiable for pharmaceuticals, as 
companies need to price above marginal cost to recoup 
significant fixed development expenses.3 
 
†  Asa Griggs Candler Professor of Law, Emory University School of Law, 
Hardy Cross Dillard Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law. 
Special thanks to Tom Berg, Anne Coughlin, Cynthia Ho, Caleb Nelson, Ruth 
Okediji, and participants at the Patents on Life Conference, St. Edmunds 
College, Cambridge University; at my Hardy Cross Dillard Chair lecture at the 
University of Virginia School of Law; and at the Georgia IP Scholars workshop. 
Thanks also to Joseph Babitz and Shawn Gannon for superb research 
assistance, the editors of Minnesota Law Review for their gracious flexibility, 
and to the librarians at the University of Virginia Law Library and the Emory 
McMillan Law Library for stellar research support. Copyright © 2018 by Margo 
A. Bagley. 
 1. See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg & W. Nicholson Price, II, Promoting 
Healthcare Innovation on the Demand Side, 4 J.L. & BIOSCI. 3, 4 (2017) (“Policy 
mechanisms to promote biopharmaceutical innovation often focus on fortifying 
incentives for firms to develop new products. Biopharmaceutical firms favor 
exclusionary rights [such as patents] that defer competition, allowing them to 
profit by charging higher prices prior to generic entry.”). 
 2. See, e.g., Chandra Mohan et al., Patents—An Important Tool for 
Pharmaceutical Industry, 2 J. PHARMACEUTICS & NANOTECH. 12, 13 (2014). 
 3. See Joseph A. DiMasi et al., Innovation in the Pharmaceutical Industry: 
New Estimates of R&D Costs, 47 J. HEALTH ECONS. 20, 21 (2016); see also JAMES 
BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE 88, 92 (2008) (distinguishing 
between the value of patents in the chemical and pharmaceutical areas from all 
other technological areas). Bessen and Meurer further note: 
The canonical example of the free-riding problem is traditional drug 
development. . . . About 70 percent of this [research and development] 
cost is incurred during the clinical trials necessary to obtain 
government approval. Generic drug manufacturers are not required to 
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However, these exclusionary rights translate to soaring 
drug prices in both rich and poor countries,4 despite global calls 
for access to affordable medicines.5 Yet efforts by governments 
to reduce costs, using mechanisms like compulsory licenses, 
routinely meet with censure at the hubris of even considering 
harm to the patent goose that lays the golden eggs of new 
medical breakthroughs.6 
 
repeat these same clinical trials, so their R&D costs are far less than 
those of the original manufacturer. 
Id. Similarly, John Duffy argues: 
Intellectual property is a special case of a good with declining average 
cost. The fixed costs of producing the intellectual property are the costs 
of . . . developing an innovation. Once the intellectual property has 
been created, the marginal cost of using it an additional time is very 
low; in fact, in most cases, it is essentially zero. 
John F. Duffy, The Marginal Cost Controversy in Intellectual Property, 
71 U. CHI. L. REV. 37, 40 (2004). 
 4. See, e.g., Joanna M. Shepherd, Biologic Drugs, Biosimilars, and 
Barriers to Entry, 25 HEALTH MATRIX: J.L.-MED. 139, 159 (2015); Zaheer Ud 
Din Babar et al., Evaluating Drug Prices, Availability, Affordability, and Price 
Components: Implications for Access to Drugs in Malaysia, 4 PLOS MED. 466, 
467 (2007), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1831730/pdf/pmed 
.0040082.pdf; Sharon Begley, Cancer Drugs, Though Cheaper, in the Developing 
World, Remain Unaffordable, STAT (June 6, 2016), https://statnews.com/2016/ 
06/06/cancer-drug-prices-developing-world; Essential New AIDS Drugs 
Unaffordable for Developing Countries, IRIN (July 25, 2007), http://www 
.irinnews.org/news/2007/07/25/essential-new-aids-drugs-unaffordable 
-developing-countries. 
 5. For example, Goal 3.B of the United Nations Sustainable Development 
Goals 2030 includes the targets of supporting “the research and development of 
vaccines and medicines for the communicable and noncommunicable diseases 
that primarily affect developing countries” and providing “access to affordable 
essential medicines and vaccines, in accordance with the Doha Declaration on 
the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health.” Sustainable Development Goal 3, 
Good Health and Well-Being, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/ 
sustainabledevelopment/health (last visited June 18, 2018); see also UNITED 
NATIONS, REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY GENERAL’S HIGH-LEVEL 
PANEL ON ACCESS TO MEDICINES 7 (Sept. 2016), http://z.umn.edu/ 
UNAccessToMedicines (“Over the last few decades, medical innovation has 
dramatically improved the lives of millions of people across the globe. . . . 
Despite this noteworthy progress, millions of people continue to suffer and die 
from treatable conditions because of a lack of access to health technologies.”). 
 6. See, e.g., William W. Fisher III and Talha Syed, INFECTION: THE 
HEALTH CRISIS IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD AND WHAT WE SHOULD DO ABOUT 
IT, ch. 6 (Stanford University Press, forthcoming 2017), https://cyber 
.harvard.edu/people/tfisher/Infection.htm (noting several reasons for the 
infrequent use of compulsory licenses despite the strong need for cheaper drugs, 
including that “the pharmaceutical firms disadvantaged by compulsory licenses 
and the governments of the countries in which those firms are based sometimes 
retaliate (or threaten to retaliate) against the countries that use them”); 
Muhammad Zaheer Abbas, Pros and Cons of Compulsory Licensing: An 
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Through compulsory licensing, a nation allows a third party 
to practice a patented invention without the patent owner’s 
permission, and requires that third party to pay a government-
specified royalty to the patent owner.7 A compulsory license does 
not require the patent owner to do anything except sit back and 
receive the royalties from the third party. But it does prevent the 
patent owner from stopping that third party from practicing the 
patented invention. 
Viewed from a property perspective, criticizing compulsory 
licenses might seem quite justified, as the right to exclude is the 
paradigmatic feature of private property. However, the very 
definition of patents as property remains a contested issue; as 
Bessen and Meurer note, “[l]awyers and legal scholars . . . tend 
to speak of patents not as a form of property, but as analogous 
to other forms of property. Some argue that the analogy might 
not be appropriate, others that the analogy is long-standing.”8 
This is because patents and other forms of intellectual property 
(IP) lack some attributes of property, despite sharing others. For 
example, patented subject matter is nonrivalrous (can be used 
by multiple parties simultaneously without limit); lacks clear 
boundaries; provides minimal notice; and includes the right to 
exclude, not the right to use.9 Thus it should not be surprising 
that governments would choose to employ, via a compulsory 
license, a liability rule (the patent owner is entitled to 
 
Analysis of Arguments, 3 INT’L J. SOC. SCI. & HUMAN 254, 254–55 (2013) 
(cataloging arguments against compulsory licenses). 
 7. CYNTHIA M. HO, ACCESS TO MEDICINE IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY: 
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS ON PATENTS AND RELATED RIGHTS 127 (2011). 
See also Jatinder Mann & Dinesh Kumar, Product Patent in Pharmaceuticals 
and Compulsory Licensing, in PATENT LAW AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN 
THE MEDICAL FIELD, 113 (Rashmi Aggarwal & Rajinder Kaur eds., 2017) 
(noting that the royalty may be “far less than the patent owner could obtain in 
a free market”). 
 8. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 3, at 6 (internal citations omitted). They 
further note that “[t]oday there is vigorous debate among intellectual property 
law scholars between those who generally approve of the propertization of 
intellectual property law, and those who do not.” Id. at 30. 
 9. Id. at 6, 8, 54; see also MARK A. LEMLEY ET AL., INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE, at I-2 (2016). The authors argue: 
The fact that the possession and use of ideas is largely “nonrivalrous” 
is critical to intellectual property theory because it means that the 
traditional economic justification for tangible property does not fit 
intellectual property. In the state of nature, there is no danger of 
overusing or overdistributing an idea, and no danger of fighting over 
who gets to use it. Everyone can use the idea without diminishing its 
value. 
Id. 
 2466 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [102:2463 
 
compensation for use of the invention) and not a property rule 
(the patent holder can preclude use of the invention) for patent 
infringement in certain circumstances.10 Patent rights are not 
absolute. 
The legitimacy of compulsory licenses under international 
law is not truly in question. The United States and several 
European countries have issued numerous explicit and de facto 
compulsory licenses in various technological areas over the 
years.11 Moreover, the 1995 World Trade Organization 
Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
(TRIPS) ultimately requires12 all member countries, most of 
 
 10. See, e.g., Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, 
Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. 
REV. 1089, 1092 (1972); Sean Flynn et al., An Economic Justification for Open 
Access to Essential Medicine Patents in Developing Countries, 37 J.L. MED. & 
ETHICS 184, 184–85 (2009). 
 11. See, e.g., James Love, Written Comments and Notice of Intent to Testify 
at the Special 301 Public Hearing Monday, February 24, 2014 at the Offices of 
USTR, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT’L (Feb. 7, 2014), https://www.keionline.org/ 
wp-content/uploads/KEI_2014_Special301_7Feb20014_FRComments.pdf. As 
Love explains: 
[T]he United States itself is [a] major user of compulsory licenses. . . . 
[This includes] the extensive non-voluntary uses of patents and 
copyrights under [28 U.S.C. § 1498 (2012)], such as the compulsory 
licenses benefiting contractors for NASA . . . and the growing number 
of compulsory licenses granted by federal judges, when they forgo the 
granting of injunctions in patent infringement cases, in favor o[f ] 
forward looking royalties as a remedy for infringement [per] eBay[,] 
Inc. v. MercExchange. . . . These include a number of medical 
inventions. . . . [The] USTR also intervened recently to permit Apple 
Computer to import mobile computing devices and iPADs that 
infringed on Samsung patents. In recent comments . . . USTR has used 
linguistic gymnastics to deny that our USA style nonvoluntary uses of 
patent inventions are “compulsory licenses.” But denying the obvious 
does not make the obvious invisible to the world. 
Id. See also James Packard Love, Recent Examples of Compulsory Licensing of 
Patents, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT’L (Mar. 8, 2007), https://www.keionline.org/ 
book/publications-and-research-notes/kei-rn-2007-2-recent-examples-of 
-compulsory-licensing-of-patents (describing the issuance or threat of issuance 
of compulsory licenses by a variety of countries). 
 12. See Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 
Extension of the Transition Period Under Article 66.1 of the TRIPS Agreement 
for Least Developed Country Members for Certain Obligations with Respect to 
Pharmaceutical Products, WTO Doc. IP/C/73 (Nov. 6, 2015), https://docs.wto 
.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?filename=q:/IP/C/73.pdf (discussing how 
least developed country members are not required to provide patents on 
pharmaceutical products until 2033). Least developed countries (LDCs) are 
United Nations–designated low-income countries confronting severe structural 
impediments to sustainable development. List of Least Developed Countries (as 
of June 2017), UNITED NATIONS (June 2017), https://www.un.org/ 
development/desa/dpad/wp-content/uploads/sites/45/publication/ldc_list.pdf. 
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which are low and middle-income countries (LMICs), to 
eventually provide patents on pharmaceutical products while 
also explicitly allowing compulsory licenses under certain 
conditions.13 Nevertheless, the moral “rightness” of countries in 
the global south issuing compulsory licenses for pharmaceuticals 
seems very much in question, with such tools often being labeled 
as theft and otherwise mischaracterized as expropriation.14 
Theft rhetoric in patent law is not new but has a particularly 
pernicious effect in this context. Theft rhetoric tends to constrain 
policy choices and government actions, overly extending the 
boundaries of the patent grant beyond the social bargain for 
products that can mean life or death to millions of individuals, 
especially those in LMICs. 
 
 13. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 
Art. 31, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 313–14 [hereinafter TRIPS]; see also 
Ellen F.M. ’t Hoen et al., Data Exclusivity Exceptions and Compulsory Licensing 
to Promote Generic Medicines in the European Union: A Proposal for Greater 
Coherence in European Pharmaceutical Legislation, 10 J. PHARMACEUTICAL 
POL’Y & PRACT. no. 10:19, 2017, at 6 (“The right of governments to grant 
compulsory licences, including for public non-commercial use, is acknowledged 
in international law, including in TRIPS.”). 
 14. See also Letter from Livia Leu, Swiss Ambassador, to Dr. Carolina 
Gomez, Adviser, Colombian Ministry of Health and Social Protection (May 26, 
2015), https://www.minsalud.gov.co/sites/rid/Lists/BibliotecaDigital/RIDE/VS/ 
MET/patent-of-Imatinib-glive-closing-arguments.pdf (criticizing Columbia’s 
plan to issue a compulsory license on the cancer drug Gleevic). Leu makes the 
following argument: 
While compulsory licenses are permissible under the WTO TRIPS 
Agreement on the condition of compliance with the terms and 
conditions set out in its Art. 31, they are also considered a policy tool of 
last resort. A compulsory license is tantamount to an expropriation of 
the patent owner and constitutes a deterrent to future research and 
development of innovative medicines and their placing on the market 
in Columbia. Accordingly, it is our view that . . . all other options are 
[to be] exhausted before the issuing of a compulsory license is being 
contemplated. 
Id. Compulsory licenses are not tools of last resort; as the WTO Doha 
Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health makes clear, countries have the right 
to determine when compulsory licenses are necessary. World Trade 
Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, WTO Doc 
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/ 
mindecl_trips_e.pdf. Moreover, expropriation is the government taking of 
private property with little or no compensation; compulsory licenses under 
international law require, at a minimum, adequate or reasonable compensation. 
See TRIPS, supra note 13, at art. 31(h). See also, Letter from Dr. Deborah 
Gleeson et al. to Juan Manuel Santos, President of the Republic of Colombia 
(May 16, 2016), https://www.keionline.org/wp-content/uploads/5-16-2016-letter 
-to-colombia-santos-imatinib-license.pdf (letter from 122 health, intellectual 
property, and trade experts defending Colombia’s right to issue a compulsory 
license). 
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This Article contemplates the validity of theft rhetoric in 
relation to the right of countries to grant compulsory licenses 
from an unconventional perspective; that of biblical teachings on 
what it means to steal.15 Part I describes the use of theft rhetoric 
in relation to IP infringement broadly and drug-patent 
compulsory licenses in particular. Part II challenges the 
contention, suggested by theft rhetoric, that compulsory licenses 
are morally wrong as a form of stealing, by considering the 
meaning of theft in the context of its Judeo-Christian origins. 
Part III considers the cogency of the accusation that the issuance 
of compulsory licenses in developing countries destroys 
pharmaceutical-company innovation incentives. Part IV 
concludes that expanding, as the Bible does, the definition of 
theft to include the possibility that a property owner may be 
stealing from the poor, can help us to properly evaluate the 
morality of drug-patent compulsory licenses. 
I.  PATENTS, DRUGS, AND THE LANGUAGE OF 
EXPROPRIATION   
Through the patent mechanism, a government grants an 
inventor the right to exclude others from making, using, selling, 
offering to sell, or importing a patented invention into a country 
for the patent term, approximately twenty years from the filing 
date.16 Patent rights are territorial, so inventors must apply in 
each country or region where they desire protection and the 
 
 15. While not common, other legal scholars have applied biblical insights 
to legal questions as diverse as environmental ethics, capital punishment, 
dispute resolution, and professionalism. See, e.g., Jennifer Gerarda Brown, For 
You Also Were Strangers in the Land of Egypt: How Procedural Law and Non-
Law Enable Love for “Strangers” and “Enemies,” 28 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 667, 
670 (2010) (discussing professional responsibility and dispute resolution); 
Patrick M. Laurence, Note, He Beareth Not the Sword in Vain: The Church, the 
Courts, and Capital Punishment, 1 AVE MARIA L. REV. 215, 219–20 (2003) 
(discussing capital punishment); Lucia A. Silecchia, Environmental Ethics from 
the Perspectives of NEPA and Catholic Social Teaching: Ecological Guidance for 
the 21st Century, 28 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 659, 675 (2004) 
(discussing the environment). I, too, have previously used insights from biblical 
parables to illuminate issues relating to patents and self-replicating 
technologies. See Margo A. Bagley, Grant Me Justice Against My Adversary: 
What Parables Can Teach Us About Organic Seed Growers & Trade Assoc. v. 
Monsanto Co., in DIVERSITY IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 211 (Irene Calboli and 
Srividyha Ragavan eds., 2015); Margo A. Bagley, The Wheat and the (GM) 
Tares: Lessons for Plant Patent Litigation from the Parables of Christ, 10 U. ST. 
THOMAS L.J. 683 (2013). 
 16. TRIPS, supra note 13, arts. 28 and 33. 
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resulting patent is only valid in that territory.17 Moreover, 
because patent laws differ by country, an inventor may obtain a 
patent in one country and not in another on the same invention. 
Broadly speaking, when a third party makes, uses, sells, or 
offers to sell an invention in a country, or imports a patented 
invention into that country, without the patent owner’s 
permission, that third party has engaged in patent 
infringement.18 Garden variety patent infringement is a strict 
liability offense; no particular mental state is required to violate 
a patent owner’s rights.19 Nevertheless, enhanced damages may 
be awarded for willful infringement, and, controversially, some 
countries even provide criminal remedies for patent 
infringement.20 Thus it is perhaps unsurprising that patent 
infringement is sometimes characterized as theft. Consider the 
following examples: 
“What makes patent theft so attractive is that 
infringement is not a criminal act and those found guilty 
face no jail time.”21 
“The theft (or ‘infringement’) of a patent . . . is typically 
handled as a civil matter.”22 
“Licensing is simply a legitimate cost of doing business. 
Not paying that cost is theft.”23 
 
 17. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property art. 4, Mar. 
20, 1883, 828 U.N.T.S. 305, 319 (1979). 
 18. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2012). 
 19. See, e.g., id. § 271(a) (containing no scienter requirement for direct 
infringement). 
 20. See J.W. BAXTER ET AL., WORLD PATENT LAW AND PRACTICE, App. 
2A.00 (providing a list of countries with criminal penalties for patent 
infringement as of September 2017). See generally Irina D. Manta, The Puzzle 
of Criminal Sanctions for Intellectual Property Infringement, 24 HARV. J.L. & 
TECH. 469 (2011) (discussing criminal penalties in IP law). 
 21. Pat Choate, Patent Theft as a Business Strategy, HUFFINGTON POST 
(May 23, 2010), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/pat-choate/patent-theft-as-a 
-busines_b_508780.html (emphasis added). 
 22. Richard Stim, Intellectual Property Crimes, NOLO: INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTYLAWFIRMS.COM, http://www.intellectualpropertylawfirms.com/ 
intellectual-property/ip-crimes.htm (last visited June 18, 2018). 
 23. John Wiley, Patent Infringement Is Theft, Plain and Simple, WASH. 
POST (Nov. 17, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/in-theory/wp/ 
2015/11/17/patent-infringement-is-theft-plain-and-simple. Moreover, President 
Donald Trump recently tweeted: “The U.S. is acting swiftly on Intellectual 
Property theft. We cannot allow this to happen as it has for many years!” 
President Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Mar. 7, 2018, 10:38 
AM), https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/971409845453762560. 
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The use of theft framing is not new to IP. Trade secret 
misappropriation is often labeled as theft,24 and in copyright and 
trademark law, criminal penalties are available for 
counterfeiting, which also involves a close link with the notion of 
theft.25 The ubiquitous FBI notices that appear at the beginning 
of copyright protected movies have long linked copyright 
infringement and piracy, a form of theft.26 On some level, 
infringement does involve third-party unpermitted use of 
something to which a government-granted right attaches, and 
certainly some of the types of infringement being characterized 
in this way are more egregious than others. 
The notion that theft is wrong, that it is even immoral, 
derives, at least in part, from the Judeo-Christian roots of the 
Ten Commandments and their injunction against stealing.27 The 
Ten Commandments, or Decalogue, is known as “the moral 
law,”28 and the violation of many of its tenets, such as those 
against adultery, lying, and stealing, are actions widely deemed 
immoral or wrong in the United States even today. One striking 
example of linking IP infringement to violation of a biblical 
precept is found in Grand Upright Music Ltd. v. Warner Bros. 
Records, Inc., where the defendant was accused of sampling a 
small portion from one of the plaintiff’s recordings.29 The opinion 
begins as follows: 
 
 24. In fact, a few years ago, Congress passed the Theft of Trade Secrets 
Clarification Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-236, 126 Stat. 1627 (codified as 
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1832 (2012)). 
 25. 18 U.S.C. § 2320(b)(1) (“Whoever commits an offense under subsection 
(a) [by counterfeiting]—if an individual, shall be fined not more than $2,000,000 
or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both.”). 
 26. See Anti-Piracy Warning Seal, FBI, https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/ 
white-collar-crime/piracy-ip-theft/fbi-anti-piracy-warning-seal (last visited 
June 18, 2018) (providing a seal containing the phrase “FBI ANTI-PIRACY 
WARNING” that owners of a copyright, in works to which criminal penalties for 
infringement attach, may use adjacent to the following language: “The 
unauthorized reproduction or distribution of a copyrighted work is illegal. 
Criminal copyright infringement, including infringement without monetary 
gain, is investigated by the FBI and is punishable by fines and federal 
imprisonment.”). 
 27. “Thou shalt not steal.” Exodus 20:15 (King James). 
 28. See John A. Eidsmoe, The Use of the Ten Commandments in American 
Courts, 3 LIBERTY U. L. REV. 15, 43–44 (2009). Professor Eidsmoe identified 515 
cases mentioning the Ten Commandments and a further 331 cases referencing 
the Decalogue. Id. at 15. He notes that “these case citations cover a time span 
from the early 1800s to the present time, demonstrating an unbroken tradition 
of looking to the Ten Commandments as the moral foundation of [U.S.] law.” Id. 
at 18–19. 
 29. 780 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
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“Thou shalt not steal” has been an admonition followed since the dawn 
of civilization. Unfortunately, in the modern world of business this 
admonition is not always followed. . . . The conduct of the defendants 
herein, however, violates not only the Seventh Commandment, but also 
the copyright laws of this country.30 
When a judge begins his decision with the line, “Thou shalt 
not steal,” it is a pretty safe bet that things will not turn out well 
for the defendant, and the defendant was found to have infringed 
the copyright in that case. Importantly, the judge explicitly 
classified copyright infringement as a violation of the biblical 
commandment against stealing, a moral wrong. This is not an 
isolated occurrence; references to the Ten Commandments have 
appeared in at least 846 cases since the early 1800s. As John 
Eidsmoe notes, “These usages demonstrate how thoroughly 
ingrained into our culture the Ten Commandments have 
become, to the point that the usage of this terminology lends 
instant recognition and moral authority to the injunctions they 
describe.”31 
A surprising number of theft-of-property cases, dealing with 
tangible and intangible property, mention the Seventh 
Commandment (or Eighth, depending on which version of the 
Bible is used).32 While many of these cases are old, some are 
rather new. And while the courts are not explicitly relying on the 
Commandment as the basis for the decision, invoking the 
biblical admonishment is doing some work for the judge; a link 
is being made between the moral law and theft. In Edgenet, Inc. 
v. Home Depot USA, Inc., the court also alluded to modern IP 
laws as being derived from the Seventh Commandment: 
The ancient admonition “thou shalt not steal” expresses a value that is 
basic to and underlies the law of property: one cannot freely 
appropriate to him or herself what has been produced by the labor, 
efforts, or capital of another. While the plaintiff . . . did not formally 
allege that the defendants . . . contravened the Seventh 
 
 30. Id. at 182 (emphasis added). 
 31. Eidsmoe, supra note 28, at 43–44. 
 32. See, e.g., Fountain v. State, 109 So. 463, 464 (Fla. 1926) (noting that the 
meaning of the word steal “has been pretty thoroughly understood since the 
[E]ighth [C]ommandment was brought down from Sinai, or at least since it was 
translated into English”); Rochon v. Iberia Par. Sch. Bd., 601 So. 2d 808, 809–
10 (La. Ct. App. 1992) (“One of the commandments is ‘Thou shalt not steal.’ 
Stealing and theft are synonymous and are criminal acts. . . . So, this Court 
holds that theft (especially of these funds) is an immoral act.”); State v. Jim, 508 
P.2d 462, 465 (Or. Ct. App. 1973) (quoting Cameron v. Hauck, 383 F.2d 966, 971 
(5th Cir. 1967) (“Theft is a synoptic concept: the Eighth Commandment 
condemns theft without explaining every possible nuance and contrivance in its 
accomplishment.”)). 
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Commandment, [the Plaintiff] has accused the defendants of violating 
nearly every modern derivation of the biblical edict.33 
It is unlikely that courts and commentators link the moral 
law and IP infringement unconsciously or even thoughtlessly, 
especially in light of the increasing domestic and international 
efforts to criminalize IP infringement.34 However, such rhetoric 
is particularly concerning when compulsory licensing of drug 
patents is characterized as theft. With a compulsory license, 
national and international law allows a third party to use a 
patented invention without the permission of the patent owner, 
who is entitled to receive adequate compensation for such use.35 
Theft rhetoric in relation to compulsory licensing employs moral 
overtones, and it seems uniquely designed to counter what might 
otherwise appear to be a moral obligation to save lives when it 
will not harm one to do so. Consider the following examples. 
A few years ago, The Wall Street Journal published an op-
ed castigating the Thai government’s issuance of compulsory 
licenses on two HIV/AIDS drugs and a heart-disease drug. 
According to Boston University School of Law Dean Emeritus 
Ronald Cass, Thailand had engaged in “theft”: 
The European Union’s trade commissioner . . . recently joined the U.S. 
in protesting Thailand’s effective theft of pharmaceutical companies’ 
intellectual property. . . . [T]here is growing appreciation that 
trampling patents to allow a middle-income nation to cut its spending 
on drugs seriously threatens the world’s system of protections for 
innovation.36 
Though Thailand is considered a middle-income nation, its 
per capita gross national income was a mere $5,640 in 2016.37 
One of the op-ed’s striking aspects was the characterization of 
Thailand as both ripping off drug companies and harming 
 
 33. Edgenet, Inc. v. Home Depot USA, Inc., No. 09-CV-747, 2010 WL 
148389, at *1 (E.D. Wisc. Jan. 12, 2010), aff ’d, 658 F.3d 662 (7th Cir. 2011). 
 34. See Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan S. Masur, Innovation and 
Incarceration: An Economic Analysis of Criminal Intellectual Property Law, 
87 S. CAL. L. REV. 275, 276–79 (2014) (observing an “expansion of the use of 
criminal sanctions to deter IP violations” but arguing against the use of those 
sanctions in most cases). 
 35. Because the government generally determines what comprises 
adequate or reasonable compensation, there may be disagreement regarding 
whether that standard is met in a given case. See generally JOHN R. THOMAS, 
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43266, COMPULSORY LICENSING OF PATENTED 
INVENTIONS (2014) (discussing compulsory licensing laws in the United States 
and several other countries). 
 36. Ronald A. Cass, Patent Remedy, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 28, 2007), https:// 
www.wsj.com/articles/SB118824874547610202. 
 37. Data for Upper Middle Income: Thailand, WORLD BANK, https:// 
data.worldbank.org/?locations=XT-TH (last visited June 18, 2018). 
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innovation, when it was in fact complying with its international 
obligations. The license was for the Thai public-health system 
and thus constituted “public non-commercial use” within the 
meaning of TRIPS Article 31(b).38 Also, as Jill Johnstone and 
James Love noted, the public health reasons for the licenses 
were quite legitimate: 
In 2006, Thailand had an average per capita income of $8.19 per day. 
For the bottom 80 percent of the income distribution, the average was 
$5.22 per day. To illustrate the Thai concerns regarding affordability 
of products, it is useful to note that the pre-compulsory licensing price 
for the heart disease drug Plavix was $2 per day, or nearly 40 percent 
of the average income of the bottom 80 percent of the population.39 
Like Cass, other commentators have used theft language to 
describe compulsory licenses, including the CEO of 
pharmaceutical giant Bayer AG, who characterized a different 
compulsory license as “essentially . . . theft.”40 The Indian 
government granted the compulsory license on a cancer drug 
that Bayer had priced so high in India that it was available to 
only two percent of the patients who needed it.41  
 
 38. See HO, supra note 7, at 134. 
 39. Letter from James Love, U.S. Co-Chair, and Jill Johnstone, European 
Co-Chair, Trans Atlantic Consumer Dialogue Working Group on Intellectual 
Property, to Susan C. Schwab, Ambassador and U.S. Trade Representative, and 
Peter Mandelson, European Commissioner for International Trade (Mar. 17, 
2008), http://test.tacd.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/TACD-IP-2008-Letter 
-To-S.-Schwab-and-P-Mandelson-on-Compulsory-Licensing.pdf; see also Inthira 
Yamabhai et al., Government Use Licenses in Thailand: An Assessment of the 
Health and Economic Impacts, 7 GLOBALIZATION & HEALTH, no. 28, 2011, at 9, 
11 (concluding that Thailand’s compulsory licenses resulted in increased access 
to the medicines, with no appreciable decline in exports or foreign direct 
investment). 
 40. Ketaki Gokhale, Merck to Bristol-Myers Face More Threats on India 
Patents, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 28, 2014), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/ 
2014-01-21/merck-to-bristol-myers-face-more-threats-on-india-drug-patents; 
see also Editorial, Theft, Extortion, and AIDS, CHI. TRIB. (July 6, 2005), http:// 
articles.chicagotribune.com/2005-07-06/news/0507060005_1_compulsory 
-licensing-drugs-called-protease-inhibitors-brazilian-congress (“No matter how 
you package it, Brazil’s campaign against patents held by U.S. pharmaceutical 
firms amounts to international thievery and extortion.”); Nirmal Ghosh, Battle 
Rages over Thai Actions on AIDS Drugs, STRAITS TIMES, May, 28, 2007 (Sing.), 
2007 WLNR 9967069 (noting that a U.S. lobbying group “accused Bangkok of 
‘stealing’ American and European innovation”); Merrill Matthews, Miracle 
Drugs Ripped Off, GEELONG ADVERTISER, Dec. 9, 2008, at 15 (Austl.), 2008 
WLNR 23639900 (“In Thailand and Brazil, politicians have decided to reward 
inventors of medical miracles not with accolades, but with compulsory licenses. 
This is a fancy name for simple theft.”). 
 41. Shamnad Basheer, Bayer ’s Nexavar, Patent Working and Compulsory 
Licensing: Mind the (Information) Gap!, SPICYIP (Apr. 27, 2015), https:// 
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When using this theft rhetoric or framing, commentators 
generally send two related but distinct messages: (1) compulsory 
licenses are morally wrong because stealing is morally wrong; 
and (2) compulsory licenses will harm innovation and society will 
not get the new drugs it needs.42 
They thus appeal both to moral outrage and understandable 
self-interest. Each message will be considered in turn. 
II.  COMPULSORY LICENSES: MORALLY WRONG OR 
MORALLY RIGHT?   
First, if compulsory licenses are morally wrong because it is 
morally wrong to steal, and the moral wrongness of theft derives 
in some measure from the Judeo-Christian moral law embodied 
in the Ten Commandments, then it may be instructive to take a 
closer look at the meaning of theft under that moral law. 
Accusing someone of stealing is a serious matter. In the 
Bible, theft is a sin, a violation of a command that is sacred in 
Judeo-Christian traditions. However, the Ten Commandments 
 
www.spicyip.com/2015/04/bayers-nexavar-patent-working-and-compulsory 
-licensing-mind-the-information-gap.html. 
 42. See Phil Kerpen, Editorial, Time to Get Tough on India for Stealing All 
of Our Stuff, BAXTER BULL., Apr. 21, 2014, at A4, 2014 WLNR 37483767. 
Kerpen states: 
Quite simply, from pharmaceuticals to motion pictures . . . India is 
stealing our stuff. . . . Strong protections for [IP] rights of innovators 
are absolutely critical to raise the capital and justify investing it in 
developing new cures. The greatest threat to innovation globally now 
comes from India’s policies. 
Id. (emphasis added); Jasson Urbach, State Will Undercut Itself with New IP 
Policy, BUS. DAY, Feb. 28, 2014 (S. Afr.), 2014 WLNR 5917470 (“Compulsory 
licences allow the government to break a patent and give a licence to a local 
manufacturer to produce a drug. This amounts to state-sanctioned theft of 
property. . . . [I]f we weaken drug patents, we will discourage companies and 
investors from developing the next generation of medicines.” (emphasis added)). 
A more subtle argument by pharmaceutical companies and their governments 
is that countries issuing compulsory licenses will not receive significant foreign 
direct investment, an assertion that is also not substantiated, as many factors 
go into foreign direct investment decisions and IP protection is only one. See Lee 
Branstetter et al., Has the Shift to Stronger Intellectual Property Rights 
Promoted Technology Transfer, FDI, and Industrial Development? 9 
(unpublished manuscript), http://www.people.hbs.edu/ffoley/BFSWIPO.pdf 
(last visited June 18, 2018) (“[T]he poorest countries attract little FDI, and a 
change in the IPR regime may do relatively little to induce large FDI flows 
simply because the degree of IPR protection is only one of many determinants 
of inward FDI.”); see also Nitya Nanda, Editorial, This Isn’t Case of Tech Theft, 
PIONEER (Mar. 18, 2016), http://www.dailypioneer.com/columnists/oped/this 
-isnt-case-of-tech-theft.html (“The developed nations’ argument that 
compulsory licensing in India will scare foreign investors, is bogus.”). 
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do not exist in isolation, but rather as part of a larger and richer 
context that both prohibits actions and prescribes affirmative 
duties to humankind. As such, the Ten Commandments are far 
more than just a bunch of thou shalt nots. 
Probably the most illuminating way to think about their 
true meaning is through the explanation Jesus gave when, asked 
by an expert in the law which was the greatest commandment, 
He said: 
“Love the Lord your God with all your heart and with all your soul and 
with all your mind.” This is the first and greatest commandment. And 
the second is like it: “Love your neighbor as yourself.” All the Law and 
the Prophets hang on these two commandments.43 
In other words, Jesus explains that the Ten Commandments, 
perhaps surprisingly, are about love. Love for God in the first 
four, and love for your neighbor in the last six. 
We show love to God by not putting other gods before him,44 
by not bowing down to idols,45 by not taking His name in vain,46 
and by choosing to spend His Sabbath with Him.47 In terms of 
 
 43. Matthew 22:37–40. Jesus’s answer is also repeated in Mark, where it is 
footnoted as referring to Deuteronomy 6:4–5 and Leviticus 19:18. See Mark 
12:28–34. It also appears, in the context of the lawyer answering Jesus, and 
Jesus affirming his answer, in Luke 10:25–28, and serves as a prelude to the 
parable of the Good Samaritan. That Jesus is indeed referring to the Ten 
Commandments can be further seen in a comparison of Luke 10:25–28 and Luke 
18:18–23, in which a rich young ruler also asks Jesus what he must do to inherit 
eternal life, and Jesus responds by rattling off the last six commandments 
relating to love for one’s neighbor. Then, when the young man states that he 
has kept all of those commandments since his youth, Christ tells him: “You still 
lack one thing. Sell everything you have and give to the poor, and you will have 
treasure in heaven. Then come, follow me.” Luke 18:18–23. Upon hearing this, 
the young man became very sad and went away, because he loved money and 
his possessions (his idols) more than he loved God. Id. 
 44. See Exodus 20:2–3 (“I am the Lord your God. . . . You shall have no other 
gods before me.”). 
 45. See id. at 20:4–5 (“You shall not make for yourself an idol in the form of 
anything. . . . You shall not bow down to them or worship them; for I, the Lord 
your God, am a jealous God.”). 
 46. See id. at 20:7 (“You shall not misuse the name of the Lord your God, 
for the Lord will not hold anyone guiltless who misuses his name.”). 
 47. See id. at 20:8–11. Exodus further states: 
Remember the Sabbath day by keeping it holy. Six days you shall labor 
and do all your work, but the seventh day is a Sabbath to the Lord your 
God. On it you shall not do any work, neither you, nor your son or 
daughter, nor your manservant or maidservant, nor your animals, nor 
the alien within your gates. For in six days the Lord made the heavens 
and the earth, the sea, and all that is in them, but he rested on the 
seventh day. Therefore the Lord blessed the Sabbath day and made it 
holy. 
Id. 
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our love for, or duty to, our neighbor, dishonoring our parents is 
not loving,48 neither is murder,49 nor cheating on our spouses.50 
Nor is lying about our neighbor,51 or coveting our neighbor’s 
possessions. And stealing is definitely not loving.52 
Perhaps because of that love orientation and the context of 
duties and obligations, there are explicit instructions in the 
Bible regarding a variety of actions that would otherwise be 
considered stealing.53 And some of those actions, embodied in the 
Jewish concept of pe’ah,54 provide an interesting and useful 
analogy that can inform the way we think about compulsory 
licenses on pharmaceutical patents. The descriptions of pe’ah 
can be found in Leviticus chapters 19 and 23, and in 
Deuteronomy chapter 24: “When you reap the harvest of your 
land, . . . [d]o not go over your vineyard a second time or pick up 
the grapes that have fallen. Leave them for the poor and the 
alien. I am the Lord your God.”55 The instructions apply not only 
to vineyards but to other crops: “When you reap the harvest of 
your land, do not reap to the very edges of your field or gather 
the gleanings of your harvest. Leave them for the poor and the 
alien. I am the Lord your God.”56 Similarly, Deuteronomy 
 
 48. See id. at 20:12 (“Honor your father and your mother, so that you may 
live long in the land the Lord your God is giving you.”). 
 49. See id. at 20:13 (“You shall not murder.”). 
 50. See id. at 20:14 (“You shall not commit adultery.”). 
 51. See id. at 20:16 (“You shall not give false testimony against your 
neighbor.”). 
 52. See id. at 20:17 (“You shall not covet your neighbor ’s house. You shall 
not covet your neighbor ’s wife, or his manservant or maidservant, his ox or 
donkey, or anything that belongs to your neighbor.”). 
 53. See id. at 20:15 (“You shall not steal.”). To be sure, the Bible does 
condemn ordinary theft, and it even requires restitution when someone steals 
because they are hungry. See, e.g., id. 21:16 (dealing with kidnapping, which is 
stealing someone’s freedom); Id. 22:1–4 (dealing with stealing livestock); Hosea 
12:7 (referring to fraud by merchants); Proverbs 6:30–31 (saying one should not 
despise a thief who steals because he is hungry, but that he should still be 
punished for his crime). 
 54. In Hebrew, pe’ah means corner or side. See Strong’s Concordance, 
BIBLE HUB, http://biblehub.com/hebrew/6285.htm (last visited June 18, 2018). 
As Jeffrey Spitzer explains: “The Bible’s model of tzedakah (social justice and 
support) included a variety of agricultural gifts. Grain and produce that were 
left or forgotten during the harvest were available for the poor to glean. The 
corners of the fields (pe’ah) were also designated for the poor.” Jeffrey Spitzer, 
Pe’ah: The Corners of Our Fields, MY JEWISH LEARNING, https://www. 
myjewishlearning.com/article/peah-the-corners-of-our-fields (last visited June 
18, 2018). 
 55. Leviticus 19:9–11. 
 56. Id. 23:22. It also is interesting to note that, just as in this verse, God 
uses the phrase “the Lord your God” in each of the first four commandments of 
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provides: “When you beat the olives from your trees, do not go 
over the branches a second time. Leave what remains for the 
foreigner, the fatherless and the widow.”57 Deuteronomy further 
provides: “When you are harvesting in your field and you 
overlook a sheaf, do not go back to get it. Leave it for the alien, 
the fatherless and the widow, so that the Lord your God may 
bless you in all the work of your hands.”58 
In these examples, the poor have the right to enter onto the 
land of a property owner and harvest the leftovers from the crop. 
These are not leftovers after the workers have cleaned every 
scrap of salvageable fruit or grain. The property owner is 
instructed not to do too good a job in harvesting the crop so that 
some portion of the crop is left for the poor and the immigrant 
foreigner. In fact, these examples illustrate that loving one’s 
neighbor is so important that not only are the poor not stealing 
(nor even trespassing), the landowner is enjoined from 
harvesting to the edges of his field. Or going back to get the 
forgotten sheaf in the field. Or making a second sweep to pick up 
missed grapes in his vineyard or missed olives in his olive groves. 
What is left does not belong to the landowner and it will not harm 
him to let the poor have it. It seems God wanted people to trust 
Him, not wealth, to supply their needs. 
These overarching concepts are also reflected in Christian 
thought and tradition. For example, the Catholic catechism 
recognizes the universal destination of goods as being provided 
by God for the benefit of the whole human race,59 and it also 
forbids unjustly taking or keeping the goods of one’s neighbor or 
wronging him in any way with respect to his goods.60 Thus, while 
it affirms the importance of respect for private property, it also 
considers as theft “forcing up prices by taking advantage of the 
. . . hardship of another.”61 And as Baptist theologian Gary 
 
the Decalogue (love for God) but not in the last six (love for neighbor). The use 
of this phrase in these gleaning texts suggests that love for God also should 
motivate us to love others. 
 57. Deuteronomy 24:20. 
 58. Id. at 19. 
 59. Catechism of the Catholic Church para. 2402, http://www.vatican.va/ 
archive/ccc_css/archive/catechism/p3s2c2a7.htm (last visited June 18, 2018). 
 60. Id. para. 2409. 
 61. Id. The Catholic Church set forth this position even more forcefully in 
a 2001 submission to the World Intellectual Property Organization: 
All men and women of all nations are entitled to have whatever they 
need for their subsistence and personal advancement, taking it from 
all the resources available at any given time in history. The provisions 
protecting private property cannot therefore ever lose sight of the 
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Gunderson notes, “At the core of every major faith tradition 
stands an explicit commitment to be with the sick, the poor, the 
alienated, the marginal, the wounded, and the dying. The 
commitments are very old, but the implications are forever new 
and increasingly radical because of remarkable changes in 
health science.”62 
Now to be clear, neither the United States nor any other 
Western country is a theocracy, and this Article is not positing 
that the Ten Commandments, or even some portion of them, are 
the foundation of U.S. law.63 Nor is it suggesting the adoption of 
Levitical approaches to dealing with current day legal issues. 
Rather, this Article is: (1) an invitation to consider another 
perspective on the meaning of theft, drawn from a text widely 
considered as sacred; and (2) an argument that current uses of 
theft rhetoric in patent law, to the extent they aim to resonate 
with Judeo-Christian notions of morality, are incomplete, 
dangerous, and a misapplication of Biblical scripture. 
Such uses are incomplete because they do not take account 
of the full definition of theft in that Judeo-Christian moral 
context, a definition which includes the possibility of the 
property owner stealing from the poor. These uses represent a 
misapplication of scripture because when one invokes the power 
of the Commandment against stealing, one must also import the 
 
common destiny of all goods, so much so that it has to be said that all 
private property is subject to a social encumbrance. Consequently, 
should there be an institutional conflict between acquired private 
rights and overriding community demands, it is for the public 
authorities to set about resolving it with active involvement on the part 
of individuals and social groups. 
World Intellectual Property Organization, Document Submitted by the Holy See 
on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and 
Folklore for the First Session of the Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual 
Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore, at 4, 
WIPO/GRTKF/IC/1/7 (Apr. 26, 2001). 
 62. GARY GUNDERSON, DEEPLY WOVEN ROOTS: IMPROVING THE QUALITY 
OF LIFE IN YOUR COMMUNITY 5 (1997). 
 63. See HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF 
THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION 589 (1983) (“[N]either Jewish thought nor 
Jewish law seems to have had any substantial influence on the legal systems of 
the West, at least so far as the surviving literature shows.”). This is not to say 
that the Ten Commandments and other biblical provisions, as well as the body 
of Jewish law that developed around the Torah, has not influenced the common 
law; the case law references identified by Professor Eidsmoe attest to that. See 
Eidsmoe, supra note 28. However, the influence has not always been explicit. 
See Michael J. Broyde, The Hidden Influence of Jewish Law on the Common 
Law: One Lost Example, 57 EMORY L.J. 1403, 1403–04 (2008) (providing an 
example of the hidden influence of Jewish law on the common law of bailments). 
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underlying norms and values embodied in that Commandment. 
Such uses are also dangerous because they delegitimize a 
government’s moral obligation to provide for the health and well-
being of its citizens. When governments are threatened with 
sanctions for issuing compulsory licenses based on theft framing, 
they may be reluctant to issue such licenses to alleviate problems 
with access to medicines, and some people may die as a result of 
not getting medicines they should have received. 
It is perhaps worthwhile to remember that patent rights are 
limited property rights at best, and that their contours and scope 
are constantly being adjusted through judicial, legislative, and 
administrative action. Every court or United States Patent and 
Trademark Office (USPTO) tribunal invalidation of a patent 
based on obviousness is an indictment of an absolute-rights 
stance. Governments grant patents to meet utilitarian societal 
goals and governments decide the subject matter, scope, and 
duration of patents. Two inventors in the same country may 
independently work countless hours and develop the same 
invention; however, only one of them will receive a patent 
claiming that exact invention from that country’s patent office.64 
The United States Constitution authorizes, but does not require, 
Congress “to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by 
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the 
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”65 
Moreover, an inventor does not have a natural right to a patent. 
As Thomas Jefferson eloquently stated: 
Stable ownership is the gift of social law, and is given late in the 
progress of society. It would be curious then, if an idea, the fugitive 
fermentation of an individual brain, could, of natural right, be claimed 
in exclusive and stable property. . . . Inventions then cannot, in nature, 
be a subject of property. Society may give an exclusive right to the 
profits arising from them, as an encouragement to men to pursue ideas 
which may produce utility, but this may or may not be done, according 
to the will and convenience of the society, without claim or complaint 
from anybody.66 
 
 64. In rare cases, a patent office may inadvertently issue two patents on 
the same invention, but one would be invalid. In the United States, federal law 
provides for a civil action to determine which inventor has priority and is 
entitled to the patent. 35 U.S.C. § 291(a) (2012). 
 65. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (emphasis added). 
 66. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), in 
13 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 326, 333–34 (Andrew A. Lipscomb & 
Albert Ellery Bergh eds. 1905). But see Adam Mossoff, Who Cares What Thomas 
Jefferson Thought About Patents? Reevaluating the Patent Privilege in 
Historical Context, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 953, 1011–12 (2007) (arguing that 
natural rights philosophy undergirded the grant of patents in early America). 
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Thus, for example, in eBay v. MercExchange, the United 
States Supreme Court concluded that having a right to exclude 
does not mean the remedy for the violation of that right is an 
injunction. Rather, the statute makes the grant of injunctions 
discretionary resulting in many de facto compulsory licenses 
where injunctive relief was denied and an adjudged infringer 
was able to continue practicing the invention by paying an 
ongoing royalty.67 The same Court’s conclusion that isolated 
genomic DNA is not patent eligible is also not theft, even though 
that decision likely invalidated thousands of patent claims.68 
The fact that there may be important reasons for creating 
property rights to allow owners to internalize externalities does 
not mean that the owner should be able to internalize all of the 
positive externalities.69 Allowing the public to absorb some 
beneficial spillovers without positively harming the property 
owner can be a virtuous policy choice. 
In fact, protecting pharmaceutical products by patent is a 
relatively recent phenomenon, even in many highly developed 
countries. For example, Germany did not introduce drug patents 
until 1968, Italy until 1978, Spain until 1992, and many 
developing countries not until 2005 as a result of the WTO 
TRIPS Agreement.70 Because governments create patent rights, 
governments can impose appropriate limitations on those rights 
without such limitations being theft. Making sure the poor have 
access71 to the drugs they need in order to live, in a way that 
 
 67. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 392–93 (2006); see also 
Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., 504 F.3d 1293, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (Rader, 
J., concurring) (“[C]alling a compulsory license an ‘ongoing royalty’ does not 
make it any less a compulsory license.”). 
 68. See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 
U.S. 576, 580 (2013); see also Subhashini Chandrasekharan et al., Do Recent 
US Supreme Court Rulings on Patenting of Genes and Genetic Diagnostics Affect 
the Practice of Genetic Screening and Diagnosis in Prenatal and Reproductive 
Care?, 34 PRENATAL DIAGNOSIS 921, 921, 925 (2014). 
 69. See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. 
REV. 347, 348–49 (1967). 
 70. See Ellen ’t Hoen et al., Driving a Decade of Change: HIV/AIDS, 
Patents and Access to Medicines for All, J. INT. AIDS SOC. at 2, 4 (2011), https:// 
www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3078828/pdf/1758-2652-14-15.pdf 
(discussing Italy and Spain); Bhavan N. Sampat, Intellectual Property Rights 
and Pharmaceuticals: The Case of Antibiotics 5 (World Intellectual Prop. Org., 
Econ. Research Paper No. 26, 2015), http://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/ 
wipo_pub_econstat_wp_26.pdf (discussing Germany). 
 71. Of course, having low-cost drugs produced does not guarantee patient 
access to those drugs. There may be several factors at play that impact whether 
drugs actually reach needy people. See Lucie White, Getting Real About 
Essential Medicines: “The Last Kilometer,” 31 MARYLAND J. INT’L. L. 79 (2016) 
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does not harm the patent holder, should be viewed as part of the 
social bargain inherent in the patent system and deemed 
morally right, not morally wrong. 
III.  THE FALLACY OF COMPULSORY LICENSES AS 
DESTROYERS OF INNOVATION   
Regarding the second message, that compulsory licenses 
will harm innovation resulting in society not getting the drugs it 
needs,72 and that the poor would not have received those drugs 
without the patent incentive, two points bear mentioning: (1) we 
already are not getting many of the drugs we need; and (2) the 
ones we get we often cannot afford. These points arise because 
drug companies are incentivized, but not in the ways one might 
think. 
A. PHARMACEUTICAL COMPANY INCENTIVES: NOT DRUGS FOR 
THE GLOBAL SOUTH 
It is instructive to consider big pharma’s profitability and 
decisional inputs. The pharmaceutical industry has long been 
one of the top five, often top two, most profitable industries in 
the world. The numbers are astounding: 
  
 
(exploring the complex barriers that may exist to getting drugs the last mile, or 
last kilometer, to the patients who need them). 
 72. This argument/threat from pharmaceutical companies arises in 
relation to other kinds of price-reduction proposals as well. As Sachs and Frakt 
recount: 
The response from the pharmaceutical industry [to reduced drug 
prices] has been the same: Even if these proposals improve access to 
medicines today, they will have a negative effect on innovation in the 
future. If the government limits manufacturers’ ability to recoup the 
costs of risky research and development, including investments that 
fail to lead to marketable drugs, they will simply reduce their 
investment in developing new drugs. This could harm all of us. The 
drugs we need in the future may not be available. 
Rachel E. Sachs & Austin B. Frakt, Innovation-Innovation Tradeoffs in Drug 
Pricing, 165 ANN. INTERN. MED. 871, 871 (2016). 
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Figure 1: Pharmaceutical Profits, 201373 
 
The ability to obtain such profits is, not surprisingly, what 
drives big pharma drug development decisions because their 
goal, as for-profit corporations, is to maximize shareholder 
value.74 They are not charitable institutions and we should not 
expect them to be. 
The costs of bringing a drug to market are high and doing so 
involves significant risk.75 But innovator companies sell most 
 
 73. Richard Anderson, Pharmaceutical Industry Gets High on Profits, BBC 
(Nov. 6, 2014), http//www.bbc.com/news/business-28212223. 
 74. See Jia Lynn Yang, Maximizing Shareholder Value: The Goal That 
Changed Corporate America, WASH. POST. (Aug. 26, 2013), https://www 
.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/maximizing-shareholder-value-the 
-goal-that-changed-corporate-america/2013/08/26/26e9ca8e-ed74-11e2-9008 
-61e94a7ea20d_story.html (“Driving this change is a deep-seated belief that 
took hold in corporate America a few decades ago and has come to define today’s 
economy—that a company’s primary purpose is to maximize shareholder 
value.”); see also Anneta Konstantanides & Khaleda Rahman, Pharmaceutical 
Entrepreneur Who Jacked up AIDS Pill Price by 5,000% Says He Should Have 
Charged Even More, DAILY MAIL (Dec. 5, 2015), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/ 
news/article-3347441/Martin-Shkreli-said-raised-price-Daraprim-more.html 
(quoting Martin Shkreli, who hiked the price of Daraprim by 5000% overnight, 
as saying “[m]y investors expect me to maximize profits, not to minimize them, 
or go half, or go 70 percent, but to go to 100 percent of the profit curve that we’re 
all taught in MBA class”). 
 75. See, e.g., Rhona Finkel, The 5 Most Profitable Medications Ever 
Produced, DRUGS INFO. & SIDE EFFECTS DATABASE (May 24, 2014), http://www 
.drugsdb.com/blog/the-5-most-profitable-medications-ever-produced.html. 
Finkel makes the following argument: 
It is certainly true that—from the outside—it looks like drug 
companies live on easy street . . . but the reality is that they invest 
billions of dollars every year into research and development. However 
. . . only one out of every 5,000 to 10,000 compounds that the companies 
study in preclinical trials actually makes its way to market. . . . And of 
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drugs so far above marginal cost that the prices more than make 
up for the costs of drug development, as their annual profits 
clearly show.76 As described in a World Health Organization 
submission, “Launch prices as set by companies are not based on 
research and development investment or production costs, but 
on the outcomes of economic calculations that aim to identify the 
highest possible profit margin the market will tolerate.”77 Also, 
a recent United States Government Accountability Office Study 
notes that: 
About 67 percent of all drug companies saw an increase in their annual 
average profit margins from 2006 to 2015. Among the largest 25 
companies, annual average profit margin fluctuated between 15 and 20 
percent. For comparison, the annual average profit margin across non-
drug companies among the largest 500 globally fluctuated between 4 
and 9 percent.78 
Consider for example, imatinib, also known as Gleevec, a 
treatment for chronic myeloid leukemia (CML), a disease which 
used to be a death sentence but has been turned into a chronic 
condition.79 According to an article by 100 CML experts, 
imatinib was originally priced at $30,000 per year of treatment 
in 2001, and there were 30,000 patients in the United States, 
which would generate $900 million per year.80 At that rate, the 
developer would recoup the costs of development in its first few 
 
those, very, very few ever become blockbusters. You don’t have to cry 
for them—but it is more complicated than it initially appears. 
Id.; see also Rick Mullin, Cost to Develop New Pharmaceutical Drug Now 
Exceeds $2.5B, SCI. AM. (Nov. 24, 2014), https://www.scientificamerican.com/ 
article/cost-to-develop-new-pharmaceutical-drug-now-exceeds-2-5b (“CSDD’s 
finding, a bellwether figure in the drug industry, is based on an average out-of-
pocket cost of $1.4 billion and an estimate of $1.2 billion in returns that 
investors forego on that money during the 10-plus years a drug candidate 
spends in development.”). 
 76. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 3, at 88 (“The higher prices that 
pharmaceutical firms charge while they are still ‘on patent’ allow them to earn 
above-normal profits or ‘rents,’ that more than recoup their development 
investments.”). 
 77. WORLD HEALTH ORG., SUBMISSION TO THE UN SG HIGH LEVEL PANEL 
ON ACCESS TO MEDICINES 5 (2016), http://z.umn.edu/WHOSubmission (citing 
ED SCHOONVELD, THE PRICE OF GLOBAL HEALTH (2011)). 
 78. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-18-40, DRUG INDUSTRY 
PROFITS, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT SPENDING, AND MERGER AND 
ACQUISITION DEALS (Nov. 2017), https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/688472.pdf. 
 79. See, e.g., Maggie Fox, Cancer Pill Gleevec Keeps Patients Alive and Well 
for a Decade, NBC NEWS (Mar. 9, 2017), https://www.nbcnews.com/health/ 
cancer/cancer-pill-gleevec-keeps-patients-alive-well-decade-n730951. 
 80. The Price of Drugs for Chronic Myeloid Leukemia (CML) Is a Reflection 
of the Unsustainable Prices of Cancer Drugs: From the Perspective of a Large 
Group of CML Experts, 121 BLOOD 4439, 4440 (2013). 
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years on the market, and generate profits after that.81 The drug 
was far more successful than anticipated at prolonging life for 
CML patients; the ten-year survival rate increased from twenty 
percent to eighty percent.82 However, the price of imatinib 
increased over time from $30,000 annual to $92,000 in 2012, 
even though all research costs were accounted for in the original 
price, new indications were developed, and the patient 
population increased dramatically.83 
Despite having made tremendous profits from sales of 
imatinib, when the government of Colombia announced it was 
considering granting a compulsory license on the drug in 2015, 
Novartis, the owner of several patents on the drug, engineered 
the assertion of significant negative pressure on Colombia.84 
Two sources of the pressure were Switzerland (home to Novartis, 
the patent holder) and the United States.85 
High profits also reinforce the minimization of risk that 
comes from seeking approval for, and introducing new chemical 
entities. As a result, pharmaceutical companies have focused 
much of their marketing and development efforts on either drugs 
for rare indications for which exorbitant prices can be charged,86 
or for me-too drugs with the same mechanism of action as a prior 
blockbuster drug and with the same active ingredient, except 
now it may be in a different form, dosing regime, et cetera.87 
According to the U.S. GAO, in 2006, sixty percent of new FDA 
approvals were for me-too drugs.88 
 
 81. Id. at 4439. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. See Associated Press, Colombia Is Threatening Novartis over This 
Cancer Drug’s High Price, FORTUNE (May 18, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/05/ 
18/colombia-novartis-cancer-drug-price. 
 85. See Leu, supra note 14; Letter to President Santos, supra note 14. 
 86. See Sara Jane Tribble & Sydney Lupkin, High Prices for Orphan Drugs 
Strain Families and Insurers, NPR (Jan. 17, 2017), https://www.npr.org/ 
sections/health-shots/2017/01/17/509507035/high-prices-for-orphan-drugs 
-strain-families-and-insurers. 
 87. See Rosanne Spector, Me-Too Drugs: Sometimes They’re Just the Same 
Old, Same Old, STAN. MED. MAG. (Summer 2005), http://sm.stanford.edu/ 
archive/stanmed/2005summer/drugs-metoo.html. 
 88. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, NEW DRUG DEVELOPMENT: 
SCIENCE, BUSINESS, REGULATORY, AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ISSUES CITED 
AS HAMPERING DRUG DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS 17 (2006), https://www.gao.gov/ 
new.items/d0749.pdf. 
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Neglected tropical diseases affect more than a billion people 
each year.89 Almost 200,000 people die from these diseases 
annually.90 Millions more are so incapacitated by disease that 
they cannot work, care for themselves, or care for their 
children.91 These diseases predominantly affect the poorest 
people in the least-developed countries.92 Yet as Figure 2 from 
the European Patent Office shows, pharmaceutical research and 
development disproportionately focuses on chronic, non-
communicable diseases, even though many more disability-
adjusted life years are lost for infectious diseases.93 Thus, we as 
a global community are already not getting the best mix of drugs 
that we need.94 
  
 
 89. See Neglected Tropical Diseases, WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://www 
.who.int/neglected_diseases/diseases/en (last visited June 18, 2018). 
 90. The U.S. Government and Global Neglected Tropical Disease Efforts, 
HENRY J. KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Nov. 3, 2017), https://www.kff.org/global-health 
-policy/fact-sheet/the-u-s-government-and-global-neglected-tropical-diseases/ 
#footnote-241667-7. 
 91. See Neglected Tropical Diseases, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & 
PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/globalhealth/ntd/index.html (last visited 
June 18, 2018) (explaining that these diseases’ “disfiguring, debilitating, and 
sometimes deadly impact” cause significant social stigma as well). 
 92. Suerie Moon, Powerful Ideas for Global Access to Medicines, 376 NEW 
ENGLAND J. MED. 505, 505 (2017), http://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/ 
NEJMp1613861. In her article, Moon states: 
Whether low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) are struggling to 
treat millions of people living with HIV or to immunize refugee children 
against pneumonia, unaffordable prices mean that many people simply 
go without. Meanwhile, despite billions of public and private dollars 
invested in pharmaceutical research and development, urgent needs 
for new antibiotics and tools for other public health priorities go unmet. 
Id. 
 93. EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, SCENARIOS FOR THE FUTURE 77 (2007), 
http://documents.epo.org/projects/babylon/eponet.nsf/0/63A726D28B589B5BC 
12572DB00597683/$File/EPO_scenarios_bookmarked.pdf. 
 94. Moon, supra note 92, at 505; see also REPORT OF THE U.N. SECRETARY-
GENERAL’S HIGH-LEVEL PANEL ON ACCESS TO MEDICINES 13 (2016), http://z 
.umn.edu/UNAccessToMedicines. 
 2486 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [102:2463 
 
Figure 2: The Global Disease Burden Versus Number 
of Compounds in Development95 
 
In 2014, a whopping forty percent of new drugs approved by 
the FDA targeted rare diseases for which high prices and 
generous profit margins are common.96 In 2012, such specialty 
drugs represented a tiny one percent of prescriptions 
nationwide, “but accounted for twenty-five percent of the $263.3 
billion spent on all prescription drugs.”97 With many of the other 
approvals being for me-too drugs, we arguably are not getting 
enough of the kinds of drug innovations we need for the myriad 
diseases currently afflicting patients due to the current system’s 
skewed incentives.98 
 
 95. EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, supra note 93, at 77. 
 96. John Jenkins, CDER Approved Many Innovative Drugs in 2014, FDA: 
FDA VOICE (Jan. 14, 2015), https://blogs.fda.gov/fdavoice/index.php/2015/01/ 
cder-approved-many-innovative-drugs-in-2014. 
 97. Laura Fegraus & Murray Ross, Sovaldi, Harvoni, and Why It’s 
Different This Time, HEALTH AFFAIRS (Nov. 21, 2014), https://www 
.healthaffairs.org/action/showDoPubSecure?doi=10.1377%2Fhblog20141121 
.042908&format=full. 
 98. See generally GAO, supra note 88 (explaining the factors contributing 
to this dearth of drugs even while pharmaceutical R&D costs have increased). 
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B. PHARMACEUTICAL COMPANY INCENTIVES: EXPENSIVE 
“TREATMENTS” FOR THE GLOBAL NORTH 
But the adverse effects of the pharmaceutical industry’s 
skewed incentives manifest in ways beyond a lack of cures for 
the Global South. Throughout the world, even in high-income 
countries, companies are incentivized to develop compounds that 
turn deadly diseases into chronic conditions so that people can 
live longer and keep taking the drug. Pharmaceutical companies 
have few incentives to develop cures for diseases.99 This is not to 
say that they never develop cures; sometimes they do, but mostly 
they develop treatments because cures are problematic for drug 
companies.100 Cures generate a one-time payment, not a revenue 
stream.101 If developers price cures too high, they may encounter 
significant resistance and censure in the marketplace. The 
controversial blockbuster Sovaldi® provides a timely example of 
this phenomenon.  
Sovaldi—one of the most expensive drugs in history—sells 
for $1000 per pill.102 It provides a treatment and, in up to ninety-
five percent of cases, a cure, for hepatitis C (also called HCV), 
which is estimated to affect more than 100,000,000 people 
worldwide.103 In fact, deaths from HCV outnumbered those from 
HIV/AIDS in the United States for the first time in 2007.104 
Gilead purchased the startup Pharmasset, in 2011 for eleven 
billion dollars in order to acquire sofosbuvir, the active 
ingredient in Sovaldi.105 Gilead then finished the FDA approval 
process and launched the drug in 2013, following up with the 
 
 99. See Finkel, supra note 75 (quoting Martin Kuehne, University of 
Vermont chemist: “Pharmaceutical companies don’t like cures. Really, they 
don’t—that’s the sad thing. They like treatment. Something for cholesterol or 
high blood pressure that you take for years and years, every day. That’s where 
the profit is.”). 
 100. See id. 
 101. See id. 
 102. See STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON FIN., THE PRICE OF SOVALDI AND ITS 
IMPACT ON THE U.S. HEALTH CARE SYSTEM, S. REP. NO. 114-20, at 129 (2015) 
[hereinafter S. REP. NO. 114-20]. 
 103. Id.; Jason Millman, The New $84,000 Hepatitis C Treatment Is Losing 
Momentum for Now, WASH. POST (Sept. 18, 2014), https://www 
.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2014/09/18/the-new-84000-hepatitis-c 
-treatment-is-losing-momentum-for-now. 
 104. See Kathleen N. Ly et al., The Increasing Burden of Mortality from Viral 
Hepatitis in the United States Between 1999 and 2007, 156 ANNALS INTERNAL 
MED. 271, 273 (2012). 
 105. See S. REP. NO. 114-20, supra note 102, at 1, 3. 
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same active ingredient in a different formulation in a drug called 
Harvoni in 2014.106 
In its first full year on the market, Gilead made nearly 
thirteen billion dollars in net product sales, on the two drugs and 
over thirteen billion dollars on Sovaldi and Harvoni during the 
first nine months of 2015.107 So the company earned twenty-six 
billion dollars on a product it acquired for eleven billion dollars, 
in less than two years.108 
A 2015 Senate committee report details the story of how 
Sovaldi and Harvoni came to be priced so high, and the answer 
is disturbing. The report concluded that: 
Gilead asserted that its primary concern in developing and marketing 
Sovaldi was to treat the largest number of HCV patients possible. . . . 
In reality, Gilead’s marketing, pricing, and contracting strategies were 
focused on maximizing revenue—even as the company’s analysis 
showed a lower price would allow more patients to be treated. . . . 
Significantly, when confronted with the widespread initiation of access 
restrictions, Gilead refused to offer substantial discounts and did not 
significantly modify its contracting strategy to improve patient 
access. . . . [F]ederal healthcare programs . . . have little to no policy 
levers at their disposal to significantly impact the price of a single 
source innovator drug.109 
 
 106. See id. at 3, 9. 
 107. See id. at 2. 
 108. Ly et al., supra note 104, at 273. Sovaldi is a treatment for a disease 
that primarily affects poor people, and as such, seemingly should not exist. 
However, there is a logical explanation for its development. There are different 
genotypes of the HCV virus and interestingly, they differ by geographic region. 
So genotypes 1, 2 and 3 are common in the United States, and genotypes 4 and 
5 are common in Africa and Asia. S. REP. NO. 114-20, supra note 102, at 6. Not 
surprisingly, Pharmassett focused on developing a drug to target genotypes 
prevalent in the United States and Europe where they could maximize revenue. 
See id. Surprisingly, Sovaldi ended up being a broad-spectrum treatment that 
is effective, in combination with other drugs, against all HCV genotypes. See id. 
at 10. Thus, in light of the fact that Gilead has so much more than made up for 
its R&D costs and garnered abundant profits with more to come in the United 
States and other wealthy countries, what should be the global response when 
LMICs, like Malaysia, conclude they cannot afford the treatment price and 
decide to use a compulsory licensing mechanism? 
 109. S. REP. NO. 114-20, supra note 102, at 117, 120 (emphasis added). It is 
beyond the scope of this paper to address the situation in the United States, 
where access to drugs is also becoming a very serious problem for reasons 
including, but not limited to, patents. Having compulsory-licensing discussions 
in the United States adds a further complexity due to the fact that R&D 
decisions are based, in large part, on the U.S. market. See Michael Edwards, 
R&D in Emerging Markets: A New Approach for a New Era, MCKINSEY & CO. 
(Feb. 2010), https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/pharmaceuticals-and 
-medical-products/our-insights/r-and-38d-in-emerging-markets-a-new 
-approach-for-a-new-era. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that when United 
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So what does this mean for compulsory licenses in 
developing countries? They are often both necessary and 
justifiable.110 Pharmaceutical companies are not incentivized to 
base their research and development decisions on the possibility 
of generating profits in developing countries. They are basing 
their decisions on the needs of the United States, Europe, and 
other highly developed markets where the bulk of their revenue 
originates.111 The following chart, showing pharma revenue by 
region, illustrates this point, showing almost eighty percent of 
global pharmaceutical market revenue coming from North 
America, Europe, and Japan.112 
  
 
States Senator Bernie Sanders proposed a bill to put Sovaldi under compulsory 
license after the Veteran’s Administration (VA) ran out of funding for HCV 
treatment and was unable to put any more patients on Sovaldi, Gilead reduced 
the VA’s price to $600/pill in response. See Patricia Kime, VA, DoD Spend More 
Than $450M on Costly Hepatitis Drug, USA TODAY (Jan. 8, 2015), https://www 
.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2015/01/08/government-hepatitis-drug-costs/ 
21462363. 
 110. As a Malysian HCV report notes: 
Sofosbuvir . . . is patented in Malaysia, which means it must be sold at 
the originator companies’ proposed Malaysian price (USD $12,000 for 
twelve weeks of treatment). Given that it is estimated that the drug 
can be produced at USD $171–360 for twelve weeks of treatment, at 
volume, pricing is likely to be based on maximisation of profit margins 
rather than any rational stratification based on country developmental 
levels (as claimed by pharmaceutical companies). 
FIFA RAHMAN ET AL., AT THE EDGE OF A MIRACLE: THE HEPATITIS C VIRUS 
(HCV) EPIDEMIC IN MALAYSIA 5 (2017), https://aidsdatahub.org/sites/default/ 
files/publication/At_the_edge_of_a_miracle_HCV_epidemic_in_Malaysia_2017 
.pdf. 
 111. According to Statista, in 2015, global pharmaceutical-market revenues 
were $950 billion, up from $712 billion in 2008. Global Pharmaceutical Market 
Revenue from 2008 to 2015 (in Billions of U.S. Dollars), STATISTA, https:// 
www.statista.com/statistics/266039/global-pharmaceutical-market-revenues 
(last visited June 18, 2018). Moreover, “In 2016, the United States was still the 
largest single pharmaceutical market, generating almost 450 billion U.S. 
dollars of revenue. Europe was responsible for generating around 200 billion 
U.S. dollars.” Global Pharmaceutical Sales from 2014 to 2016, by Region (in 
billion U.S. Dollars), STATISTA, https://www.statista.com/statistics/272181/ 
world-pharmaceutical-sales-by-region (last visited June 18, 2018). 
 112. See Distribution of Global Pharmaceutical Market Revenue from 2010 
to 2016, by Region, STATISTA, https://www.statista.com/statistics/275535/ 
distribution-of-global-pharmaceutical-market-revenue (last visited June 18, 
2018). 
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Figure 3: Global Pharmaceutical Market Revenue 
 
When decisions are made about where to invest R&D 
dollars, they are made based on wealthy markets. Whatever 
drug companies earn in poor countries is largely gravy. Bayer 
CEO Marijn Dekkers confirmed this, after calling the Nexavar® 
compulsory license “essentially . . . theft,” when he explained: “Is 
this going to have a big effect on our business model? . . . No, 
because we did not develop this product for the Indian market, 
let’s be honest. We developed this product for Western patients 
who can afford this product, quite honestly.”113  
This is not to suggest that the relatively small percentage of 
revenue is not a meaningful sum which companies would not 
wish to lose. Such concerns are arguably why companies that 
voluntarily participate in access vehicles like the Medicines 
Patent Pool (MPP), as Gilead did with certain HCV patents, 
often exclude middle-income countries from the advantageous 
 
 113. Gokhale, supra note 40; see also Love, supra note 11, at 4 (“The Bayer 
CEO’s reaction to the Indian compulsory license describes the current reality 
for the majority of the world’s population. Many companies find it acceptable to 
price products out of reach for the majority of persons living in developing 
countries.”). 
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pricing deal.114 However, this potential loss of revenue does not 
justify pressuring countries to forego compulsory licensing using 
theft rhetoric. In both the Thai and Indian compulsory license 
examples, the drugs were going to poor people who would not be 
able to buy them at the price the originator pharmaceutical 
company was charging.115 These were not lost sales; these sales 
never would have been made by the patent owner.  
Moreover, in situations where the compulsory license is for 
public noncommercial use, such as the licenses granted in 
Thailand and Malaysia, the generic drugs would only be 
supplied to patients in the public health system; rich Thai and 
Malay citizens would continue to buy the expensive branded 
drugs sold by the patent owner.116 This is important because 
LMICs tend to have high income inequality, a factor that 
pharmaceutical firms count on in pricing their drugs.117 As 
Flynn et al. explain in an example involving South Africa, where 
the richest ten percent of the population earn fifty-eight percent 
of the income: 
The [pharmaceutical company] maximizes its sales in South Africa by 
selling at the price that only the top 10% can afford. At this price, the 
firm makes $814.6 million in total revenue. If the firm lowers its price 
to be able to make sales to 20% of the affected individuals (at $396 per 
patient), then it will sell twice as many medicines at a price less than 
half of the profit-maximizing price, earning substantially less ($435.6 
million). As the monopolist continues to cut prices and raise production, 
revenues fall further at almost every level of output and corresponding 
price. In other words, the firm will maximize its profits by setting a 
price unaffordable for at least 90% of people in need.118 
 
 114. See MEDICINES PATENT POOL, https://medicinespatentpool.org (last 
visited June 18, 2018) (describing the mission and vison, model, partners and 
strategy of MPP); see also Catherine Saez, Malaysia Grants Compulsory Licence 
For Generic Sofosbuvir Despite Gilead Licence, INTELLECTUAL PROP. WATCH 
(Sept. 15, 2017), https://www.ip-watch.org/2017/09/15/malaysia-grants 
-compulsory-licence-generic-sofosbuvir-despite-gilead-licence (noting that 
threat of a compulsory license by Malaysia led to the middle-income country 
being offered MPP pricing by Gilead for Sofosbuvir). 
 115. See supra notes 34–40 and accompanying text. 
 116. See HO, supra note 7, at 168. The impact of such licenses can be 
profound. The public noncommercial use-license issued in Malaysia in 2003 for 
HIV/AIDs drugs resulted in an 81% reduction in the average cost of treatment 
per month-per patient (from $315 to $58) and an increase in government 
treatment capacity from 1500 to 4000 patients. See FIFA RAHMAN, supra note 
110, at 30. 
 117. See CHRISTOPHER HOY ET AL., MIDDLE-INCOME TRANSITIONS AND 
INEQUALITY: IS THERE A LINK? 13 (2016), https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/ 
files/resource-documents/10383.pdf. 
 118. Flynn et al., supra note 10, at 189 (emphasis added). 
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Because wealthy patients in LMICs can still be expected to 
purchase the originator pharmaceutical company’s products, 
compulsory licenses are not likely to meaningfully affect even 
that further twenty to twenty-five percent of revenue in LMICs. 
This also shows that there is little incentive for pharmaceutical 
companies to lower their prices in LMICs despite the vast 
numbers of people in need of access to their medicines.  
This precise scenario resulted in the catastrophic loss of life 
on the African continent due to the pricing of HIV/AIDS drugs 
out of the reach of millions of poor people in the late 1990s and 
early 2000s. As vividly described in the movie Fire in the Blood, 
the entire continent of Africa accounted for only one percent of 
originator pharma HIV/AIDS drug sales.119 As noted by James 
Love in the movie, the entire continent was “a rounding error,” 
yet the companies took a hard line, keeping their prices at 
$10,000 to $15,000 per patient-per year in Africa, just as in the 
United States, and fought against the introduction of generic 
drugs while millions of lives were lost.120  
C. THE MORAL “RIGHTNESS” OF COMPULSORY LICENSING 
Thus it is worth asking: if the incentive to develop new drugs 
is not meaningfully121 affected by developing country markets, 
should a country allow such a drug patent (one most likely 
obtained by a foreign entity) to result in lost or impaired lives? 
Should we watch people die when it costs nothing, or very little, 
to let them live?122 Or, to put it in the context of pe’ah, shouldn’t 
 
 119. See FIRE IN THE BLOOD (Sparkwater India 2013); see also FIRE IN THE 
BLOOD, http://www.fireintheblood.com (last visited June 18, 2018) [hereinafter 
FIRE IN THE BLOOD, http://www.fireintheblood.com]. 
 120. See FIRE IN THE BLOOD, http://www.fireintheblood.com, supra note 119. 
 121. This is not to say that there is no possible effect on innovation. 
Compulsory licensing makes it even less likely that companies will develop 
drugs to treat conditions prevalent in such countries. Nevertheless, as Flynn et 
al. note: 
[F]or markets in which firms can expect demand to be highly convex—
which is likely to be true in markets for medicines in most developing 
countries—the patent system will be ineffectual in delivering much 
innovation. . . . Ultimately, the problem of finding an adequate and 
equitable mechanism to fund research and development for medicines 
in developing countries must be found elsewhere. 
Flynn et al., supra note 10, at 192 (2009). 
 122. There is also a self-interest argument for compulsory licenses in the 
infectious-disease context. We are living in a world where we are increasingly 
seeing global pandemics. See Meera Senthilingam, Seven Reasons We're at More 
Risk than Ever of a Global Pandemic, CNN (Apr. 10, 2017), https://www.cnn 
.com/2017/04/03/health/pandemic-risk-virus-bacteria/index.html. SARS, H1N1, 
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the poor have a right to needed drugs when such use of the 
patented invention will not harm the patent holder?  
Moreover, is it possible that a government has a duty to 
allow a third party to provide a drug, via compulsory license or 
some other mechanism, to its citizens in a way that will not harm 
the patent owner? Certainly. When we consider the broader 
meaning of theft illuminated by the biblical concept of pe’ah, we 
should be more willing to conclude that a LMIC issuing a 
compulsory license is not engaging in theft and its action should 
not be characterized as such. We also should be able to recognize 
that the poor do have a right to free or low-cost life-saving drugs, 
where providing such drugs does not unduly harm the drug 
developer.  
Issuing a compulsory license in accordance with TRIPS is 
not a morally culpable action, and is far removed from theft. It 
is not even defined as stealing under international law and 
involves compensation to the patent owner. Yet it is too often 
characterized as theft in a way that appears to give 
pharmaceutical companies the moral high ground and allows 
them to play the victim in terms of public relations and inciting 
governmental action against offending countries. In fact, it may 
be more appropriate to turn the tables and label, from a moral 
perspective, the pharmaceutical companies trying to keep 
needed drugs from the poor as thieves. 
The patent system was never designed to be a guarantee of 
maximum profits, rather it is supposed to have a positive impact 
on society. As described by the U.S. Supreme Court: 
The possession and assertion of patent rights are “issues of great 
moment to the public.” A patent by its very nature is affected with a 
public interest. As recognized by the Constitution, it is a special 
privilege designed to serve the public purpose of promoting the 
“Progress of Science and useful Arts.” At the same time, a patent is an 
exception to the general rule against monopolies and to the right to 
access to a free and open market.123 
If, to some extent, our notions of the moral wrongness of 
stealing derive from the Ten Commandments, we should not look 
at those commandments in isolation, but should consider also 
 
MERS, bird flu, swine flu, Ebola, Zika, the list keeps growing. These diseases 
cross borders and oceans. As such, the health of the developing world affects us 
all. To the extent more people in the developing world are immune compromised 
or lack treatment, there may be a greater spread of such diseases, or the 
development of mutations that may affect the ability of HICs to fight these 
pandemics when they reach their shores. 
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the contextual limitations on that concept. As Professor Gnuse 
explains: 
Though the gleaning laws are not extensive, they provide us with 
significant insight into the command against theft. What the modern 
mind might call theft was not so defined in the Old Testament. . . . 
Human need had a right of access to the basic essentials of life. . . . For 
the poor to take food from another person’s land was not theft, but it 
was wrong for the more affluent person to withhold it.124 
Using the label of theft to describe a particular set of actions 
and simultaneously playing the innovation card effectively 
erects a barrier that may limit a government’s ability to 
appropriately utilize compulsory licensing to meet pressing 
societal needs. So the hard questions regarding who really is 
stealing from whom do not get asked. This theft framing has no 
correlation to the most productive innovation, nor to providing 
optimal innovation; rather, it is employed to produce optimal 
profit.125 In view of the access-to-medicines crisis occurring in 
countries across the globe, it is critically important for us to tear 
down that barrier.  
  CONCLUSION   
The misapplication of a Biblical precept in the context of 
access-to-medicines tools like compulsory licenses in the Global 
South is profoundly disturbing, especially in light of the 
deafening silence that prevails with respect to the use of 
compulsory licenses in the Global North. When we consider the 
biblical analogy of pe’ah, it allows us to begin to reframe the 
discussion and ask who is stealing from whom. Are our policies 
out of balance such that the poor are being robbed of what they 
are due? These are not easy issues to address, and there are no 
risk-free solutions, no clear way to know exactly how to optimize 
access and innovation at the same time. But we may be better 
able to get to win-win outcomes if we open our eyes to other ways 
of viewing competing interests, and allow our legal discussions 
to be enlightened by analogies from important traditions that 
have in the past informed our constructions of right and wrong, 
and of morality itself.  
The value of human life is what makes the production of 
essential medicines important and worthy of powerful incentives 
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because they may improve the duration and quality of human 
life. But without proper controls, patents and other incentives 
may produce harms, which is why the patent system has always 
included various limits and safety valves on the scope of the 
patent grant. If we consider a just law to be one that improves 
the lives of human beings, then drug compulsory licenses issued 
in accordance with international law are not only legal, but they 
are also moral, and just. Governments have a moral obligation 
to provide access to life-saving treatments for their citizens and 
the use of incomplete and dangerous theft rhetoric to stigmatize 
and denigrate such efforts undermines that duty in profoundly 
important ways. 
Both patent law and the biblical Commandment against 
stealing exist within larger systems of rights and obligations. 
Recognizing this allows us to put together, as Christ did, the two 
phrasings: thou shalt not steal and thou shalt love thy neighbor 
as thyself. Blending these two phrasings of the commandment 
together allows us to view theft in relation to pharmaceutical 
patents in its proper light. We can seek and develop appropriate 
exceptions to patent rights that do not eviscerate protection, but 
provide the balance society needs to enhance access to essential 
medicines. 
